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Abstract
The food, tobacco and alcohol industries have penetrated markets in low- and middle-income countries 
(LMICs), with a significant impact on these countries’ burden of noncommunicable diseases (NCDs). 
Tangcharoensathien and colleagues describe the aggressive marketing of unhealthy food, alcohol and tobacco in 
LMICs, as well as key tactics used by these industries to resist laws and policies designed to reduce behavioural 
risk factors for NCDs. This commentary expands on the recommendations made by Tangcharoensathien 
and colleagues for preventing or managing conflicts of interest and reducing undue industry influence on 
NCD prevention policies and laws, focusing on the needs of LMICs. A growing body of research proposes 
ways to design voluntary industry initiatives to make them more effective, transparent and accountable, but 
governments should also consider whether collaboration with health-harming industries is ever appropriate. 
More fundamentally, mechanisms for identifying, managing and mitigating conflicts of interest and reducing 
industry influence must be woven into – and supported by – broader governance and regulatory structures at 
both national and international levels. 
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By 2040, low- and middle-income countries (LMICs) will experience a dramatic rise in disabilities, illness, and premature deaths from noncommunicable 
diseases (NCDs), such as cancer, diabetes, and cardiovascular 
or respiratory diseases.1 The epidemiological transition from 
communicable (and neonatal, maternal, and nutritional) 
diseases to NCDs in LMICs is driven by demographic trends, 
principally aging and economic development.1 Modifiable 
risk behaviours such as unhealthy diets, alcohol consumption, 
physical inactivity and tobacco use also fuel the rise of NCDs, 
driven in turn by hyper-urbanization, rapid economic growth, 
rising levels of disposable income, and other economic and 
socio-cultural changes associated with globalization.1-3 
Beyond these drivers of NCDs lies the growing market 
penetration in LMICs by the food, tobacco and alcohol 
industries, accompanied by the aggressive marketing of 
these products – as described by Tangcharoensathien and 
colleagues.2-4 
The growing burden of NCDs threatens not just individual 
and population-level health, but also national healthcare 
systems and social and economic development. This is 
recognized by the 2030 Sustainable Development Agenda: one 
of the targets for Sustainable Development Goal 3 (on ensuring 
health and promoting wellbeing) is reducing premature 
mortality from NCDs by one third by 2030.5 Innovative, 
cost-effective, and adequately funded healthcare systems are 
important to responding to the rise in NCDs in LMICs and 
for achieving the Sustainable Development Goals.1 Equally 
important are comprehensive national prevention strategies, 
including legal, regulatory, and fiscal capacities such as taxes 
on sugar-sweetened beverages (now introduced in over 40 
countries worldwide),6 excise taxes to discourage alcohol 
purchasing and consumption, and mandatory warning labels 
on cigarette packets, alcoholic beverages, and unhealthy foods 
and drinks, with some countries currently exploring graphic 
warning labels for sugary beverages.7-9 Tangcharoensathien 
and colleagues aptly describe a major challenge faced by 
LMICs in robustly regulating multinational corporations, 
namely industry’s undue influence on law and policy-
making.4 The authors in this commentary discuss strategies 
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for ameliorating industry interference and conflicts of 
interest in the design and implementation of NCD prevention 
measures. 
Industry Influence on NCD Law and Policy-Making
The large, multinational companies that dominate the 
processed food, alcohol, and tobacco industries are described 
as “vectors” of the NCD epidemic.2 Their most obvious role as 
disease vectors lies in the manufacture, sale and marketing of 
products that are harmful to health. Beyond this, the alcohol, 
tobacco and food industries exert a powerful influence on 
laws and policies that address the behavioural risk factors for 
NCDs. 
Tangcharoensathien and colleagues describe key tactics 
used by “Big” Food, Tobacco, and Alcohol to weaken or 
forestall NCD prevention measures, including litigating 
against strong public health interventions, using front groups 
to counter public health recommendations, funding and 
influencing research favourable to industry interests, and 
gaining preferential access to policy-making processes by 
building relationships with health leaders and legislators.4 
Industry uses a range of other tools to influence policies 
harmful to its economic interests, including pre-emption of 
state, provincial, or local laws to prevent NCDs; adopting 
self-regulation or voluntary measures to stave off stronger 
statutory regulation9,10; and shaping public dialogue on NCD 
causation, promoting discourses of individual choice, personal 
responsibility, and the “Nanny State,” while resisting science-
based interventions that facilitate shared responsibility and 
government action on NCDs.11 In addition, industry actors 
tend to set their own targets or metrics for what they are 
willing to achieve in NCD prevention, rather than adopting 
more stringent best-practice targets recommended by national 
governments or the World Health Organization (WHO). 
As the authors note, all three industries use a “playbook” of 
similar tactics to avert effective public health interventions,12 
with a growing body of evidence demonstrating their use in 
emerging as well as developed countries.2,13,14 
Should Policy Actors Engage With Health Harming Industries?
The negative influence of health-harming industries on NCD 
prevention raises questions about whether public officials 
should ever engage with industry and, if they do, how to 
manage conflicts of interest and undue industry influence. 
The WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control strictly 
forbids engagement with the tobacco industry.15 States parties 
must take steps to protect tobacco policy-making from 
industry interference (FCTC, article 5.3). Should the same 
strict standards apply to Big Food and Alcohol? 
Governments often explicitly or tacitly encourage self-
regulation by the food and alcohol industries (including 
by doing nothing or remaining complicit), or join with 
industry actors in collaborative initiatives and public-private 
partnerships that have NCD prevention objectives. Yet a 
significant body of evidence shows that self-regulatory or 
collaborative initiatives have been largely ineffective in 
achieving public health objectives,16 and some researchers 
question whether credible and effective engagement with the 
food and alcohol industries is ever possible. These authors 
point to an inherent conflict of interest between NCD 
prevention and the profit-making imperative of businesses 
selling unhealthy products, as well as the often-significant 
power imbalance between large, multinational companies 
and national governments.11,17 
In relation to the food industry, a more nuanced position 
may be to identify and assess the variety of actors and modes 
of engagement that are possible, rather than to propose a 
blanket ban on all forms of engagement. WHO’s guidance 
document on preventing and managing conflicts of interest 
in nutrition policy-making and implementation lists a six-
step process of risk assessment, balancing, and mitigation.18 
The six steps include: clearly identifying the public health 
nutrition goal to be achieved through engagement with non-
state actors; profiling, due diligence and risk assessment 
(including assessing non-state actors against exclusionary 
criteria); balancing the risks and benefits of engagement; 
risk management (including identifying the risk profile of 
external actors and the form that engagement would take, 
and introducing mitigation measures where engagement 
is considered appropriate); monitoring, evaluation and 
accountability; and transparency and communication. 
While this document provides a detailed pathway for risk 
management and mitigation, for many in civil society, any 
engagement with the food and alcohol industries is fraught 
with conflicts that cannot be managed.
In relation to the alcohol industry, a stronger case can be 
made that engagement is never appropriate, given the status 
of alcohol as “no ordinary commodity,” that alcohol cannot 
be said to be crucial to human health and existence in the 
same way as (some) foods, and the lack of any evidence that 
collaboration with the alcohol industry leads to public health 
benefits.19,20 
Managing Conflicts of Interest and Holding Industry 
Accountable
A growing body of research documents ways to make 
engagement with industry more effective, accountable and 
transparent.10,21,22 If governments plan to work with industry 
on self-regulatory or voluntary initiatives, they must take firm 
measures to avoid harmful or unjust results. Table describes 
specific recommendations for improving the effectiveness 
and accountability of such initiatives (adapted from Reeve23 
and WHO18). In addition, strong government leadership 
is essential: governments should lead processes of policy 
development and create a policy or legislative framework that 
sets targets for action against which progress can be measured 
and policy coherence maintained.24 Such legislation could also 
include principles to govern the implementation of public-
private partnerships, including the clear identification and 
mitigation of any conflicts of interest.24 Further, governments 
should (credibly) threaten legislation if voluntary or 
collaborative initiatives fail to meet public health objectives.22 
Civil society organizations and non-government watchdog 
groups play a critical role in advocating for strong NCD 
prevention measures and in monitoring both industry 
and government efforts, thereby holding both sectors 
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accountable for commitments and responsibilities. Voluntary 
or collaborative initiatives could potentially be strengthened 
by enabling non-governmental organisation participation 
on an equal footing with government and industry, and by 
granting civil society actors powers to monitor and enforce 
such initiatives.25
Tangcharoensathien and colleagues argue that a 
comprehensive strategy for managing conflicts of interest 
requires more than just the careful design of initiatives. 
Addressing industry influence and ensuring the effectiveness 
of voluntary or collaborative measures requires strengthening 
governance institutions more broadly and ensuring that 
political and regulatory processes are democratic and free 
from corruption or capture.4 At a national level this could 
include legislation requiring the disclosure of information by 
lobbyists in the form of a register, recusal of public officials 
from functions where they have a conflict of interest,18 and 
ensuring adequate funding for government institutions and 
regulatory agencies.
Emerging countries in particular may require technical and 
financial support from national and international actors to 
assist them in managing industry influence or interference 
with NCD prevention measures. For example, the beverage 
industry has invested substantial funds in defeating sugar-
sweetened beverage taxes through litigation, which may have 
a “regulatory chill” effect, particularly in LMICs without 
the legal or financial resources to defend such challenges.26 
Understanding how to defend these cases and having 
the financial capacity to do so can help ward off industry 
influence.26 This is illustrated by Bloomberg Philanthropies’ 
(and partners’) support for the Uruguayan government in 
successfully defending its tobacco control laws against a legal 
challenge by Philip Morris International under international 
trade law.27 Support for LMICs could be enabled by the 
sharing of best practice between countries on defending 
litigation and on managing conflicts of interest.26 Litigation 
and other complaints-handling mechanisms can also be used 
by countries themselves to hold industry accountable for 
the harms caused by their products and to vindicate health-
related rights, as with tobacco litigation in the United States.9 
The Importance of International Governance Frameworks
International governance can help or hinder governments in 
managing conflicts of interest and eliminating inappropriate 
industry influence on policy-making. To date, the WHO 
has taken a vague and inconsistent stance on managing 
conflicts of interest and engaging with industry.28 A strong 
stance is evident in the WHO’s Framework Convention on 
Tobacco Control; in comparison, the Strategy on Diet, Physical 
Activity and Health envisages industry participation in 
activities related to diet, physical activity and health (“thus 
formalising institutional conflicts of interest”),28,29 while the 
Global Strategy to Reduce Harmful Use of Alcohol says little on 
conflicts of interest and encourages “economic operators” to 
consider voluntary or self-regulatory action.30 
Recent documents evidence a more cautious stance, as 
with the WHO’s guidance document on managing conflicts 
of interest in nutrition policy (discussed above),18 and its 
Framework on Engaging with Nonstate Actors.31 The WHO 
Global Action Plan for the Prevention and Control of NCDs 
2013-2020 also requires Member States to protect NCD 
prevention policies from undue influence by vested interests 
and to acknowledge and manage real, perceived or potential 
conflicts of interest.32 However, there is scope to further 
clarify and operationalise the WHO’s stance on engaging with 
health-harming industries,28 particularly in relation to the 
alcohol industry.
Human rights instruments may support the efforts of 
national governments to reduce industry influence on law- 
and policy-making. Most countries have ratified at least one 
international agreement that recognizes the right to health 
and/or other health-related rights (eg, the right to food), 
such as the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights.9 Under this international treaty, States Parties 
have an obligation to respect, protect and fulfil the right to 
health, which includes preventing corporate human rights 
violations.9 Treaty monitoring bodies have recommended 
that states take legal and policy measures to address NCDs in 
reports issued as part of country periodic review processes; 
such recommendations could strengthen the position of 
countries counteracting litigation from food, tobacco or 
Table. Recommendations for Creating Effective, Transparent and Accountable Forms of Voluntary or Collaborative Initiatives With Industry 
Component Recommendation
Developing objectives/policies Consultation with a broad range of interests.
Objectives Clear, measurable objectives set by government, against which the scheme’s success or failure can be assessed.
Terms and conditions
Key definitions are clear, conditions and roles are set by government, and are expansive or demanding enough to meet 
set objectives.
Administration
Fair and transparent administration by an accountable, independent body, with the roles and responsibilities of each 
member clearly described.
Monitoring
A comprehensive, transparent, and independent monitoring system that can be used to evaluate the initiative and 
which includes baseline data, as well as a set of measurable, time-bound process and outcome indicators. The results of 
monitoring and evaluation exercises are made publicly available, to enhance transparency and accountability to external 
stakeholders. Public reporting should include information on the outcomes of the initiative. 
Enforcement
A wide range of enforcement options are available, including both incentives and deterrents, as well as an effective, 
accessible complaints-handling mechanism where appropriate. 
Review
Regular, independent reviews of the scheme’s operation, using baseline data and performance indicators, with reports 
from reviews made publicly available. 
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alcohol companies.9 
In contrast to human rights legislation, international trade 
and investment agreements potentially restrict the ability of 
states to protect NCD laws and policies from industry influence. 
They also provide industry actors with an avenue to provide 
input into public health policy-making and to challenge 
legislation via national and international litigation.9,33 For 
example, Philip Morris unsuccessfully challenged Australia’s 
tobacco plain packaging laws under an international 
investment agreement between Australia and Hong Kong 
(and also challenged the constitutionality of these laws in 
Australia’s domestic court system). Such cases illustrate that 
international investment agreements may expose countries to 
legal liability when introducing new laws on NCD prevention, 
risking “regulatory chill.”34 Trade liberalization also fosters 
foreign direct investment by companies such as Coca-Cola in 
emerging markets in LMICs, which is anticipated to increase 
consumption of unhealthy food and beverages, and to create 
tensions between government measures to encourage such 
investment and NCD prevention policies.34
It is crucial for the public health community to be active 
in trade and investment policy processes, and for national 
governments to avoid agreements that overly constrain their 
ability to introduce public health laws and policies.34 Other 
helpful measures include strengthening the global governance 
of NCDs, eg, by the WHO creating new, legally binding 
standards on nutrition and reducing harmful consumption of 
alcohol (which could be used as a reference in trade dispute 
arbitration), as well as specific language in new trade and 
investment agreements requiring consideration of WHO-
approved action plans or recommendations in any dispute 
with NCD prevention implications.33 
Countering Industry’s Pervasive Influence on NCD Policies
A large body of research documents the ways in which the 
food, tobacco, and alcohol industries attempt to influence 
law and policy-making to prevent NCDs, including in LMICs 
– a rapidly growing market for health-harming products. 
Researchers and international organisations such as the WHO 
are paying increasing attention to ways in which conflicts 
of interest can be avoided or managed, as well as reducing 
industry influence on policy-making. Active consideration 
should be given to whether engagement with food and 
alcohol industry actors should be excluded altogether. Where 
governments do engage with industry, self-regulatory or 
collaborative initiatives can be designed to improve their 
transparency, accountability, and effectiveness. However, a 
comprehensive approach to reducing inappropriate industry 
influence requires that rigorous conflicts of interest rules 
must be woven into – and supported by – broader governance 
structures at national and international levels. 
The undue influence of “Big” Food, Alcohol and Tobacco is 
far from a theoretical matter. These industries are responsible 
for millions of preventable deaths and countless suffering. If 
multinational corporations fail to exercise social responsibility, 
it is incumbent on governments – and global health bodies – 
to compel them to do so. 
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